

CONFIDENTIAL

[Redacted]
Harry E. Fitzwater
Deputy Director for Administration
7D 24 Hqs

DDA 83-1401/1

1 June 1983

25X1

25X1

DD/A REGISTRY

FILE: 10-1

Bill,

Director of Security
4E 60 Hqs

I would like to see a copy of
the Security report on your
investigation of OCC taking an
uncleared person to [Redacted]

25X1

It appears to me that there
was little regard by OTE and OGC
for using the system. Why weren't
the O/DCI and OTE Security Officers
involved? In short, it seems there
were a number of procedural errors
in this case.

~~DD/A REGISTRY
FILE:~~

/s/

Harry

DDA:HEFitzwater:kmg (1 Jun 83)

Distribution:

Orig PRS - D/OS

- ✓ - DDA Subj w/bkgd (83-1401)
- 1 - DDA Chrono
- 1 - HEF Chrono

All portions classified
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25X1
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CONFIDENTIAL**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

SUBJECT: (Optional)

DD/A Registry**83-1401**

FROM:

DD/OTE
1026 CofC

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

26 May 1983

STAT
STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. EXO/DDA
7D24 Hqs31 MAY
19831 JUN
1983

M

2.

3. ADDA

1 JUN
1983

J

4. DDA

1 JUN 1983

J

5.

6.

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10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

1-3/4: While I think OGC is a "rogue elephant," I don't think this approach will really get the culprit. There are several other concepts which should be considered:

- a. I have never heard of a component security violation!
- b. Why wasn't the O/DCL security officer involved with these certifications?
- c. Where was the OTE security officer between 3+23 May?
- d. Why didn't OTE get certifications from either their own security officer or the O/DCL security officer instead of relying on OGC?

In short, there are a number of procedural errors involved in this episode. I suggest we get copy of Security Report when investigation is finished so to who did what to

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OTE 83-1116

25 May 1983

DD/A Registry
83-1401

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

FROM:

Deputy Director of Training and Education

25X1

SUBJECT:

25X1

1. Attached is a 3 May 1983 memorandum from the Administrative Officer, Office of General Counsel to the Director of Training and Education which certifies that [] has a Top Secret clearance.

25X1

2. On 23 May, [] a professor at the University of Virginia, arrived [] and was admitted on the basis of this certification.

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3. Because of an unusual request placed [] by the Office of the General Counsel to accommodate [] while a portion of the OGC Conference was in session, we sought confirmation that [] had the proper clearances to visit []. On 23 May 1983, this office requested [] OTE Security Officer, to contact the Office of Security to determine if [] had a Top Secret clearance. The initial search was inconclusive because the last name was searched with a different spelling. Based on the attached information from the OGC memorandum, a definitive check of clearances was made on 24 May. That check revealed that [] had a full background investigation in 1975 to serve as a summer intern. In February 1983, a national Agency check was made on []. We have been informed by the Office of Security that [] does not have a Top Secret clearance nor does he have a Secret clearance.

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4. In view of what we consider to be a serious security violation based on false certification to us by OGC of [] clearances, we request that you take appropriate action with the Office of General Counsel to levy a violation against them. For our part, we will no longer accept certification from OGC on clearances, but will insist that all clearances be certified through the OTE Security Officer.

25X1

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SUBJECT:

25X1

5. A copy of this memorandum will be forwarded to the Deputy Director for Administration.



25X1

Attachment:
As Stated

Distribution:
Orig - Addee w/att
✓- DDA w/att

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